The venue for all keynotes and paper presentations is the auditorium AT 100 (Agora building, School of Theology annex).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
KEYNOTE ABSTRACTS<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Keynote 1: Catherine Wanner, An Ethics of Care among the \u201cJust Orthodox\u201d<\/em>, Thu 25 September 13:30<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n There are multiple ways in which Ukraine is unique within the Eastern Christian world. These distinctions have only heightened since Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine began in 2014. There is more than one canonically recognized Orthodox Church in Ukraine and multiple religious minority groups. And yet, in many respects, a single religious institution is not the primary adversary. Rather, after three and a half years of war, the need to fight despair and the indifference to suffering it breeds has become the primary adversary. Based on ethnographic research in Ukraine, I argue that popular appeals to an ethics of care trade on the premise that there are moral obligations inherent in relationships, which become enshrined in lived religious practices, and provide an antidote to challenging despair. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Keynote 2: Benjam Puustinen, The psychological influence of the Moscow patriarchate on the Baltic states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union<\/em>, Thu 25 September 17:30<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Tactics involve the study and management of military forces, capabilities, and units to succeed in combat. They are closely linked with operational art and influenced by other sciences and theorists. New theories in military science help shape our understanding of future warfare and combat. Religion can be a powerful tool for rulers to influence and unite populations. In Russian strategy, the main goal of conflict is often to shape people\u2019s consciousness rather than occupy territory. This is why religious language and non-military means play a significant role in Russia\u2019s modern art of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n My research aims to deepen understanding of the Moscow Patriarchate\u2019s psychological influence in the Baltics after the Soviet Union, highlighting its national security implications and relevance for evaluating Russia\u2019s future political goals in the region. The Moscow Patriarchate, closely tied to the Russian state and used as a tool in hybrid warfare, has long maintained strong connections with state leadership. In response, the Estonian Parliament recognized it as supporting Russia\u2019s military aggression in 2024 and, in 2025, passed a law requiring Estonia\u2019s largest Orthodox church to cut ties with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Moscow Patriarchate supports Russian state leadership through soft and psychological influence, reinforcing official narratives, defending Soviet history, consolidating power via believers and property, and seeking legitimacy by shaping the global Orthodox community. Keynote 3: Tornike Metreveli, From Euphemism to Eschatology: The Russian Orthodox Church in the Wars in Georgia and Ukraine<\/em>, Fri 26 September 10:30<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2008 the Russian Orthodox Church spoke of \u201cbrotherly peoples\u201d in Georgia; by 2024 it proclaimed \u201cHoly War\u201d in Ukraine. Why the divergence? I argue geopolitical symphonia: when canonical territory is contested, civilizational narratives ignite, shifting churches from pastoral restraint to co-producing sacralized war. A discourse analysis (2008\u20132024) pinpoints Ukraine\u2019s 2018\u20132019 autocephaly crisis as the hinge\u2014absent in Georgia\u2014driving a lexical turn from pastoral grief to crusade grammar and culminating in the 2024 decree.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Keynote 4: Cyril Hovorun, Orthodox Political Theologies in the 20th Century<\/em><\/strong>, Fri 26 September 17:00<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Keynote 5: Iryna Fenno Orthodox churches in Ukraine during the war: changes in the life of communities,<\/em> Sat 27 September 9:00<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The war has significantly affected the functioning of religious organizations in Ukraine. On the one hand, the task of surviving and persevering in times of military aggression is faced by all religious communities, including the Orthodox. Clergy and believers are under constant shelling and in danger of occupation, while churches, chapels, and other religious buildings are being destroyed and damaged. Based on the data collected within the project \u201cReligion on Fire: Documenting Russia’s War Crimes Against Religious Communities in Ukraine,\u201d the latest statistics on destruction and specific cases of damages of Orthodox religious buildings during the war will be presented. On the other hand, churches and communities are becoming centers of humanitarian, psychological, and spiritual assistance and support. However, no less important is how the church hierarchy is responding to the war situation and what changes have taken place in the life of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). Based on an analysis of speeches and statements by the heads of the UOC and the OCU, official documents, and decisions of the Synods, the main trends in Orthodoxy in Ukraine during the full-scale invasion will be identified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Keynote 6: Harutyun Harutyunyan, Armenian Apostolic Church during and after the last Nagorno-Karabakh war<\/em>, Sat 27 September 11:00<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The last war in Nagorno-Karabakh in fall 2020 lasted only 44 days but has awoken deep collective traumas and several historical memories of previous conflicts. During heavy clashes with the usage of new military technologies and hybrid psychological attacks, the leadership of Armenian Apostolic Church and its clergy were standing on the side of their troops. The clergy were involved in the fundraising and distribution of donated materials to the soldiers and refugees. Some of them were providing directly military counseling and conducting special worship services for the blessing of soldiers and for their victory on the field. However, after the ceasefire of November 9th<\/sup>, both catholicoi from St. Etchmiadzin and Cilicia started to condemn the government of the Republic of Armenia in defeatism and call the Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign. Especially after the final loss of de facto independent Republic of Artsakh and the enforced displacement of its 120000 residents in September 2023, the church leadership has taken a more overt political stance: a) Mobilizing protests against government, especially over border demarcation and peace negotiations with Azerbaijan; b) Using apocalyptic rhetoric such as referring to N. Pashinyan as the \u201cAntichrist\u201d and demanding his immediate resignation; c) Calling for civil disobedience or – in case of two archbishops – even for armed uprise; d) Confirming strong ties to the Russian Orthodox Church and perceived loyalty to the Kremlin. Therefore, following questions will be investigated in this paper from the viewpoint of Practical and Political Theology: Will these tensions between the church and state get worse, especially as church leaders continue to challenge the Prime Minister and support opposition? Will more people turn away from the church, which would weaken its influence in the country? Will the Armenian Church need to choose between staying politically loyal to Russia and become divided in its own homeland, or focusing on spiritual healing, national unity, and helping people move forward after the last war instead? <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n PAPER ABSTRACTS<\/p>\n\n\n\n Session 1: Philosophical and theological approaches to justifying war<\/em>, Thu 25 September 16.00-17.30<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Serafim Sepp\u00e4l\u00e4 (University of Eastern Finland): Violence of Ontology? Dangers of Ontological Emphases in Orthodox Theology <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOntology of violence\u201d has been a popular subject in recent decades. This paper turns the concepts around and explores the mechanisms that may potentially serve to turn the concept of ontology itself violent, in the context of Orthodox theology, viewed in contrast to Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Foucault\u2019s approach. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Since Aristotle, ontological labelling has been used to justify phenomena such as slavery, subjugation of women, mistreatment of animals, as they have been seen as being inferior by nature, i.e. by their ontological status. In recent decades, Orthodox theologians have applied the concept of \u201contology\u201d or \u201contological\u201d in almost all areas, offering it as a solution to various anthropological, ecclesiological, psychological, epistemological, ethical and cosmological problems. This is problematic at the outset, as it appears to downplay the actual problem by redefining it and removing it to an abstract conceptual sphere, potentially exposing it to misusage. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In what way the ontological emphases in modern Orthodox theology\u2014particularly, John Zizioulas, Christos Yannaras, and Vladimir Lossky\u2014can unintentionally open the door to violent patterns of thought? These thinkers emphasize \u201contology\u201d as the grounding of personhood, communion, and ecclesial life. For Zizioulas, being is relational; the person exists only as communion. Yannaras similarly grounds ethics in ontology, contrasting Greek patristic \u201crelational ontology\u201d with Western essentialism. Lossky\u2019s apophaticism and the essence\u2013energies distinction develops a theological ontology rooted in mystery and deification. However, when this well-intended theological language becomes absolutized or confined to \u201cus\u201d at the expense of the Other, it risks ontologizing identities in ways that exclude, hierarchize, or deny self-definition and change. <\/p>\n\n\n\n By contrast, Levinas criticizes ontological thinking that absorbs or reduces the Other into totality. For him, any system that defines the Other in advance risks violence. Foucault, from a different angle, uncovers how ontological categories sustain systems of exclusion, surveillance, and control in modern institutions. According to these perspectives, even a theology of communion may become coercive if it prefigures what it means to be a \u201cperson\u201d or \u201cChurch member\u201d in fixed terms that fail to truly hear the Other. <\/p>\n\n\n\n While Orthodox ontology aims to be therapeutic and divinizing, it is not immune to the negative effects of ontological closure. A critical, dialogical ontology\u2014open to otherness, change, and asymmetry (in Levinas\u2019s sense)\u2014is needed. To remain faithful to its apophatic and kenotic core, Orthodox theology should continually interrogate its own ontological assumptions in dialogue with both the tradition of the early Church and contemporary ethical critique. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Olga Tomyuk (Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg): The Creation of the Artificial \u201cHeroon\u201d River (in Chersones, Crimea) and Its Stylization as the Site of Prince Volodymyr\u2019s Baptism in the Context of the Russo-Ukrainian War<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The contribution provides insight into an ongoing interdisciplinary doctoral project examining the conceptual, theological, and ritual dynamics of sacralization in the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches (Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)) in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Both religious and extra- or non-religious forms of sacralization are considered. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Such processes of sacralization can be observed in connection with a construction project in Crimea, specifically the recently completed \u201cNew Chersones\u201d in the ancient city of Chersones. Since Crimea\u2019s annexation by Russia in 2014, Chersones has been portrayed by Russian Orthodox clergy, church leaders, and political actors \u2014 especially Vladimir Putin \u2014 as a sacred site, a \u201cRussian Mecca,\u201d even equated with the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. This multifaceted sacralization serves to legitimize the annexation of Crimea politically, historically, and theologically, and constructs a continuity worth describing between the Russian nation, state, and Orthodoxy. The related founding myth is anchored in Chersones and presented by Putin as a \u201cmonolithic history\u201d extending to the current Russo-Ukrainian War. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond the description of the construction project of the \u201cNew Chersones,\u201d its planning, implementation, and the attribution of specific meanings, the paper also deals with the artificial \u201cHeroon River,\u201d completed alongside the so-called museum complex. The contribution analyzes the attribution of a specific sacredness to this river, such as its stylization as the site of Prince Volodymyr\u2019s baptism \u2014 a portrayal contested in Ukrainian discourses and countered by efforts to renaturalize the Potschajna River in Kyiv. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This draws on the concept of sacralization as a processual category of social transformation, as developed by Magnus Schlette and Volkhard Krech, while rivers are approached as concepts capable of mythologization or metaphorical significance, such as through river metaphors, origin myths, or sacred geographies. Ukrainian cultural scholar Galyna Sporadets has already explored such attributions in her fruitful analysis of the Dnipro River, identifying, among others, a \u201creligious river concept\u201d that assigns symbolic and sacred functions to the river, embedding it into a specific collective religious and national imagination. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The analysis of the \u201cHeroon River\u201d \u2014 its spatial design, symbolic context, and religious or mythopoetic semantics \u2014 demonstrates how sacralization can manifest materially and discursively, showing how rivers as conceptual elements contribute to the formation of sacred spaces. Furthermore, this research connects to further research fields such as Material Religion, sacred geography, and sacred architecture. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Anni-Maria Peltola (University of Eastern Finland): Bible References in Statements Given by Patriarch Kirill in the Context of the Russo-Ukrainian War<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n This study systematically examines the logical structure of biblical argumentation in Patriarch Kirill\u2019s speeches during the Russo-Ukrainian War. By applying Stephen Toulmin\u2019s argumentation model, it identifies patterns of justification used to frame Russia\u2019s military actions within a religious framework. The research hypothesizes that biblical references serve an essential argumentative function, reinforcing either the legitimization of military aggression or the alignment of Russian Orthodoxy with state policies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Given the ongoing war in Ukraine, this study remains highly relevant. Kirill\u2019s statements have provoked international debate, impacting ecumenical relations and theological discourse. By exposing the inner mechanics of religious argumentation, the research contributes to a critical understanding of how theological rhetoric shapes moral and political decisions in wartime. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The study examines Patriarch Kirill\u2019s sermons and official statements published on the Russian Patriarchate\u2019s website, focusing on references to biblical justification for Russia\u2019s geopolitical stance and Orthodox identity. The research is conducted in three phases: <\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. Argumentation Analysis of Kirill\u2019s Statements \u2013 Applying Stephen Toulmin\u2019s argumentation model, the study breaks down claims, warrants, and implicit assumptions, identifying how biblical citations function within Kirill\u2019s rhetorical structure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. Diachronic Exegetical Analysis \u2013 Investigating the historical and theological development of the cited biblical passages, assessing their role in traditional scriptural interpretation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. Text-Internal Argumentation Analysis \u2013 Determining the original function of the cited passages within their biblical context, clarifying whether Kirill\u2019s use aligns with their intended meaning or constitutes a strategic reinterpretation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This methodological approach allows for a systematic evaluation of how religious argumentation constructs persuasive narratives within ideological discourse. By providing a structured analysis of biblical argumentation within Kirill\u2019s rhetoric, this study offers valuable insights into how religious discourse can be employed to shape geopolitical narratives. Understanding these mechanisms not only contributes to theological scholarship but also aids in assessing the broader societal implications of faith-based political messaging in contemporary conflicts. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Session 2: National, state and political pressures on churches<\/em>, Fri 26 September 9.00-10.30 <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Gra\u017eina Bielousova & Milda Ali\u0161auskien\u0117 (Vytautas Magnus University): A paradigmatic case of religious securitization: the Lithuanian government’s support for the establishment of the Orthodox Exarchate under the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2022\u20132024<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n This paper analyzes the Lithuanian government’s support for the establishment of the Orthodox Exarchate under the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2022\u20132024 as a paradigmatic case of religious securitization. In the aftermath of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Russian Orthodox Church\u2019s overt alignment with Kremlin military and ideological narratives\u2014including Patriarch Kirill\u2019s theological legitimation of aggression\u2014the Lithuanian Orthodox Church, under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate, came to be viewed not merely as a religious community but as a potential vector of foreign influence and a threat to national sovereignty. Public trust further eroded when several Orthodox priests were defrocked for refusing to commemorate Patriarch Kirill in their prayers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Drawing on sociohistorical analysis and media discourse, we examine the Lithuanian government’s intervention on behalf of the defrocked priests who appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople and initiated the formation of a new ecclesial structure in Lithuania. Using the theoretical frameworks of securitization theory (Buzan 1998), the state of exception (Agamben 2005), and postcolonial critiques of Russian imperialism, we argue that this state involvement constitutes a breach of the constitutional principle of church-state separation (Article 43 of the Lithuanian Constitution). However, state actors justified their actions as a response to an existential geopolitical threat and framed them as an act of \u201crestoring historical justice\u201d linked to Lithuania\u2019s pre-imperial Orthodox legacy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This restoration, however, remains deeply ambivalent. While it raises important questions about religious freedom and the securitization of religious minorities, it also highlights how Lithuania\u2019s postcolonial trauma continues to shape both domestic and foreign policy. Ultimately, this case reveals how Orthodoxy\u2014and Lithuania itself\u2014remain entangled in broader geopolitical contestations between East and West. It complicates narratives of religious autonomy and neutrality in post-Soviet Europe, exposing the ways in which Orthodoxy is instrumentalized in processes of national boundary-making, collective memory, and statecraft under conditions of war. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Serhii Yepik (Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics): The transformation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) in the context of Ukraine\u2019s political turbulence and full-scale war<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n I explore the transformation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), formerly under the Moscow Patriarchate, in the context of Ukraine\u2019s political turbulence and full-scale war. In the first part of the paper, I analyze how the UOC operated under political pressure during the Yanukovych era, functioning as a channel for Russian influence. Special attention is paid to the role of oligarchs and politically connected individuals who, despite lacking canonical competence, manipulated the Church\u2019s leadership for personal and ideological gain. This resulted in compromised synodal governance and erosion of theological dialogue. <\/p>\n\n\n\n A case study highlights a businessman-politician with theological education but no ecclesiastical mandate, who influenced church affairs through emotional coercion and ambition, undermining the church\u2019s integrity. The second part of the paper examines the post-2022 redefinition of the UOC\u2019s identity amid Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion. Facing public distrust and internal crisis, the UOC formally distanced itself from the Moscow Patriarchate. I argue that this marked a deep transformation: the Church began responding pastorally to national trauma\u2014supporting war victims, displaced persons, and the spiritually wounded. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Another key focus is the UOC\u2019s defense of Ukrainian liturgical identity in occupied territories, where Muscovite practices threaten local traditions. The Church now serves not only as a spiritual institution but also as a cultural stronghold and symbol of national resilience. My study concludes that the UOC has evolved from a passive instrument of soft power to an active participant in Ukraine\u2019s spiritual and cultural resistance, contributing to both religious renewal and civic consciousness. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Janko Stefanov (University of Veliko Tarnovo): The Influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on the Bulgarian Orthodox Church: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Implications<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The paper attempts to explore the question about the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate and the complex effects it has on the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (later in text, BOC). Using the retrospective approach and historical synthesis, it points out to some important past events, how they impacted the BOC and what are their current implications. The paper examines the narratives and attitudes this influence helps steadily maintain among members of the Church and the Bulgarian society in general. It explains why they constitute a problem, how Orthodoxy is ultimately being used to push through the Kremlin\u2019s current political interests in Bulgaria and the importance of overcoming this influence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n I would like to start my abstract with a historical parallel. In 1941, at the height of WWII Bulgaria was drawn on the side of Hitler\u2019s Germany. In late February 1943 an agreement was signed for the deportation of the Bulgarian Jews to forced-labor camps in Germany (at this time their harrowing true purpose was not widely known yet). The agreement was met with a fierce opposition from Bulgarian politicians, intellectuals, ordinary citizens, and finally yet importantly, the BOC. The Holy Synod took a strong stance against the discriminating anti-Jewish state policy \u2013 metropolitans Stefan of Sofia and Kirill of Plovdiv were the most active ones. They wrote protest letters to the Government and the Tsar and encouraged many supportive initiatives for the persecuted families. By the summer of 1943 the planned deportations were cancelled. Years later the two metropolitans were recognized from Israel\u2019s Yad Vashem Institute as \u201cRighteous Among the Nations\u201d, while the BOC received a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. It was the only religious institution within Hitler\u2019s territorial control that openly declared its position against the deportation of Jews and ultimately managed to save them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In late February 2022 another war broke out \u2013 the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin started a full-scale invasion on Ukraine. It\u2019s now the summer of 2025, and apart from individual statements from some of the metropolitans, the Holy Synod of the BOC still hasn\u2019t issued an official declaration condemning the war of Putin\u2019s Russia against a sovereign nation, that happens to be its closest neighbor. The reason behind the Synod\u2019s abnormal silence lies within a problematic heritage the BOC had \u201cacquired\u201d, largely from the communist period (1944-1989), that remains present today \u2013 the influence of Moscow\u2019s Patriarchate. Although a large part of the faithful and the clergy in Bulgaria are aware of the real purpose it holds, it\u2019 still a factor that\u2019s certainly not to be overlooked \u2013 and the recent events surrounding the BOC serves as a clear reminder for that. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Session 3: The armed forces, the media and civil-military relations<\/em>, Fri 26 September 13.00-14.30<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Jan Pohjonen (University of Eastern Finland): Making sense of it all \u2013 Kosovo War and ethnoreligious violence in Helsingin Sanomat editorials between 1998 and 1999 <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The leading newspaper in Finland Helsingin Sanomat described the atrocities perpetrated by the Serb forces in the Kosovo War (1998\u20131999) as the worst committed during the long breakup of the former Yugoslavia. This study takes a critical look at what led to the paper\u2019s adoption of a partial editorial stance that viewed President Slobodan Milosevic\u2019s security apparatus with scorn while rallying the Finns to aid the outgunned Kosovars. What is uncovered is an editorial board bewildered by bloodshed. Not only did it see the conflict against the backdrop of Balkan\u2019s most recent civil wars but also through the horrors of World War II and the peninsula\u2019s century-long ethnoreligious hatred. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In this study the qualitative content analysis is used to better understand the editorial stance of Finland\u2019s paper of record. This has meant a close and chronological reading of all the Kosovo War related editorials while at the same time keeping an eye on the historical circumstances, they were a part of. For journalistic context, this study utilizes both original interviews with Helsingin Sanomat editors and editorial writers as well as relevant archive material. Both are important as editorials are opinion pieces written behind closed doors but meant to affect change. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The study is a part of the author\u2019s doctoral dissertation research that focuses on the crisis-ridden religious landscapes of the Helsingin Sanomat editorials between 1991 and 1999. The article-based dissertation will include 4 independent articles, two of which have been published in peer-reviewed journals and one is currently pending review. The most recent 2024 article focused on the Kosovo War and religion\u2019s believed role in the conflict. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Tiia Liuski (University of Eastern Finland): Responses to moral challenges, individual growth and thriving \u2013 a military chaplaincy perspective<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n This paper examines the role of military chaplains (MC) in addressing moral injury, facilitating recovery, and fostering individual growth and flourishing. By integrating interdisciplinary research, the paper highlights how MCs provide holistic support through spiritual care, ethical resilience-building, and meaning-making processes. The findings emphasize the importance of proactive approaches, such as ethical training, in equipping soldiers to navigate morally challenging situations. While the study primarily focuses on NATO countries, its insights underscore the critical role of chaplains in promoting soldiers\u2019 psychological and moral well-being. The paper concludes that MCs contribute not only to immediate crisis intervention but also to long-term ethical and emotional resilience, reinforcing their significance in modern military structures. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Jarkko Kosonen (University of Eastern Finland): Religion, politics, and community: the role of the KFOR operation to support Orthodox church in Kosovo after the 1990s war<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Session 4: Churches as instruments of hybrid influence<\/em>, Fri 26 September 16.15-17.30<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Bjarge Schwenke Fors (UiT The Arctic University of Norway): Holy Rus in the High North:<\/strong> The Russian Orthodox Church’s Grey Zone Strategies and Geopolitical Ambitions in the Norwegian Arctic<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The term “grey zone” refers to the ambiguous space between traditional concepts of war and peace, where states and non-state actors utilize coercive, subversive, and hybrid strategies to achieve their objectives at the expense of others. This paper explores how the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) employs grey zone strategies to further its own and Russia’s geopolitical and territorial ambitions in the Norwegian Arctic. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The ROC can be seen as a geopolitical actor in its own right. It advances its own geopolitical visions\u2014most notably that of \u201cHoly Rus\u201d (Russian: Svyataya Rus)\u2014and actively engages in territorialization, the marking and claiming of space, both within Russia and in regions beyond its borders, most notably Ukraine. While the ROC enjoys a degree of autonomy, it is closely aligned with the Kremlin\u2019s territorial objectives and its territorializing activities are largely coordinated with those of the Russian regime. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In recent years, the Norwegian regions of Svalbard and Varanger have become focal points for the ROC\u2019s territorial efforts abroad. These areas are located near the Russian border, have historical ties to Russia, and are home to Russian minorities. The ROC\u2019s activities in these regions are evident through tangible actions, such as the erection of large Orthodox crosses, as well as performative practices like pastoral visits, pilgrimages, speeches, and naming rituals, all of which emphasize the Russian and\/or Orthodox identity of these areas. Through these actions, the church subtly but effectively challenges and undermines Norwegian sovereignty in the region. By rhetorically framing parts of the Norwegian Arctic as part of “Holy Rus,” the ROC also provides spiritual justification for Russia\u2019s broader geopolitical ambitions in the area. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The paper contributes to ongoing academic debates on the intersection of religion, geopolitics, and international relations. It broadens the understanding of grey zone strategies by illustrating how religious institutions\u2014often regarded as apolitical or spiritual entities\u2014can actively participate in territorialization and support state-driven geopolitical objectives. By examining the Norwegian Arctic, this study offers a nuanced perspective on the interplay between religion and power dynamics in contested borderlands, providing valuable insights into the broader role of religious institutions in shaping international disputes and sovereignty claims. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Using qualitative methods, the study underpinning this paper analyzes interviews, speeches, reports, and media from both Russian and Norwegian perspectives. It also incorporates secondary literature on geopolitics, church-state relations, and Arctic disputes to provide a comprehensive understanding of the ROC\u2019s activities in the High North. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Andriy Dudchenko (Kyiv Orthodox Theological Academy: Instrumentalization of Religion in the Russo-Ukrainian War<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Research Question: How has the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) utilized the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) doctrine to ideologically support Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine, and what are the consequences for societal division and conflict dynamics? <\/p>\n\n\n\n I will employ a qualitative approach, integrating discourse analysis of ROC statements, Patriarch Kirill\u2019s sermons, liturgical \u2018prayer for the Holy Rus\u2019 and resolutions from the World Russian People\u2019s Council (1993\u20132024) with a historical examination of the “Russian World” doctrine\u2019s role in Ukraine. Primary sources will include open-source materials such as clergy quotes, Russian state media, and UOC-MP documents, supplemented by Tetiana Derkach\u2019s investigations (The Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine: Anatomy of Betrayal). Fieldwork will include eyewitness accounts from occupied areas (e.g., Bucha, 2022), highlighting grassroots perspectives. The analysis will trace the ROC\u2019s influence from the 1990s to the 2022 invasion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The ROC has instrumentalized the “Russian World” doctrine to frame Ukraine as part of a unified Orthodox civilization under Moscow\u2019s authority, justifying Russia\u2019s military actions as a defense against Western secularism and Ukrainian nationalism. Since the 1990s, the ROC\u2019s network in Ukraine (via the UOC-MP) has propagated pro-Russian ideologies, with figures and groups collaborating with Russian agents. The doctrine, solidified under Patriarch Kirill, has evolved into a \u2018theology of war,\u2019 portraying Russia as a messianic \u2018katechon\u2019 fighting a Manichaean battle against invented \u2018fascists.\u2019 This rhetoric has fueled societal polarization, with some UOC-MP parishioners initially disoriented by Russian propaganda, as evidenced in Bucha. However, grassroots Ukrainian resilience, including interfaith initiatives and the OCU\u2019s counter-narratives, challenges this narrative, though the UOC-MP\u2019s ties to Moscow hinder broader reconciliation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This paper will enrich academic debates on religion\u2019s role in hybrid warfare by analyzing the ROC\u2019s ideological weaponization through the “Russian World” doctrine. It will highlight the interplay of theology and geopolitics in legitimizing aggression, offering insights into the ROC\u2019s complicity in war crimes (e.g., Bucha) and the challenges of post-war reconciliation. By integrating eyewitness accounts and investigative data, the study will underscore the need for countering divisive religious narratives. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The venue for all keynotes and paper presentations is the auditorium AT 100 (Agora building, School of Theology annex). KEYNOTE ABSTRACTS Keynote 1: Catherine Wanner, An Ethics of Care among the \u201cJust Orthodox\u201d, Thu 25 September 13:30 There are multiple ways in which Ukraine is unique within the Eastern Christian world. These distinctions have only […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1293,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-228","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
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The lecture will outline the evolution of political theologies in the Eastern Christian milieu during the long 20th century. It will begin with the definitions of and distinctions between political and public theologies, as well as the dialectics of the relationship between the church, the state, and the public square. The lecture will differentiate between two major trends in the modern Orthodox political theology: conservative and liberal ones. The former dominated in the interwar period, while the latter received prominence after WWII. The lecture will examine the most recent theories of civilisational exceptionalism, such as Greek and Russian worlds, and their political implications. It will identify two camps in the Orthodox political theology: the one that accepts and appreciates modern liberal democracy and the other one that criticises it. It will conclude with a proposal on how to develop further the Orthodox political theology. According to this proposal, the church has to align more with civil society than with the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n